Carboun, an intiative to promote conservation and sustainable development in the Middle East, has published an excellent new visual guide to energy use and carbon emissions in the region. The guide includes the Arab world’s share of carbon emissions, and those of individual States in the region, as well as trends in emissions. Moreover, it examines the divide between “Resource Rich” countries in the region, many of which have extremely high per capita greenhouse gas emissions (including the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th highest levels of per capita emissions), with Resource Poor countries, most of whom have extremely low emissions. The graphic also seeks to isolate the reasons for the substantial divide between countries in the region in this context.

The infographic is a striking reminder to students that it’s overly simplistic to portray the world as one in which only Northern States  are profligate producers of emissions. It could stimulate some  interesting discussion about whether Southern countries with egregiously high per capita emissions should be required to take on emissions reduction commitments. It would also be a good opportunity to discuss the equity of UNFCCC’ Art. 4(8)(h), which mandates special concern for “countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products.”

There’s a very interesting potential reading in a recent issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, focusing on the implications of international trade for attribution of greenhouse gas emissions between developing and developing countries, Glen P. Peters, et al., Growth in Emissions Transfers via International Grade from 1990 to 2008, 108(21) PNAS 8903-8908 (2011) (Open Access). The study, which employed a trade-linked global database for the carbon dioxide emissions of 113 countries and 57 economic sectors from 1990 to 2008  yields some striking results with large implications for questions of equity and the role of trade measures  in climate change policy.

Among the take-aways of the study:

1. Carbon dioxide emissions worldwide have risen 39% from 1990 to 2008, with growth accelerating in the past decade;
2. Global carbon dioxide emissions from the production of exported products have increased from 20% of global CO2 emissions in 1990 to 26%, similar in magnitude to land-use change-related emissions
   1. Trade-linked emissions grew 4.3% per year, far father than growth of global population, at 1.4% annually:
3. Estimated Annex B emissions were reduced by 2% from 1990-2008; however, international trade  “relocated” 16 Gt CO2 from Annex B to non-Annex B States during this period, a net emission transfer 520% higher in 2008 from 1990
   1. Net emission transfers could rise to approximately 16% of Annex B emissions in 2020, comparable to the most optimistic projection for emissions reductions by Annex B States under the Copenhagen Accord
4. In terms of consumption-based inventories, 11% of the growth of global carbon dioxide emissions is attributable to Annex B consumption; thus, a significant portion of the growth of consumption in Annex B States is masked in the emissions statistics of developing countries
   1. Even in the case of the European Union, which reduced its territorial emissions by 6% from 1990-2008, the increase in consumption emissions from non-Annex B countries are larger than these reductions
5. Chinese emissions accounted for 55% of carbon dioxide emissions growth from 1990-2008, with Chinese exports accounting for 18% of growth in global carbon dioxide emissions;
6. Increases in consumption in Annex B countries has thus caused an increase I global emissions that is masked by statistics only of terrestrial reductions;
7. The limited analysis of emissions and trade data conducted to date indicates that bulk of emissions transfers from Annex B to developing countries don’t reflect carbon leakage associated with climate policies, but rather othe economic and policy factors.

This article could generate some good class discussion on a number of issues, including the following:

1. Should the emissions of developing countries associated with exports to developed countries somehow be accounted for in the greenhouse gas inventories of Annex B countries under Kyoto Protocol and any successor?
2. Does the evidence that a substantial portion of developing countries’ greenhouse gas emissions are associated with exports to developed countries argue against efforts to enact tariff or other barriers against products of developing countries that fail to enter into binding commitments to reduce their emissions?
3. How might we determine if purported shifts in greenhouse gas emissions to developing countries are associated with efforts to reduce emissions in developed countries?

David Victor & Kassia Tanosek recently published an article in Foreign Affairs on the future of renewable energy that would be an excellent student reading.

Among the take-aways from the piece:

1. The clean energy industry in Western countries is “heading for a crisis” as a consequence of substantial cuts in public subsidies by cash-strapped government. Early manifestations of this crisis include a drop in the number of new wind turbine installations in 2010, the first time that has happened in 20 years, and substantial drops in the value of clean energy companies;;
2. The fundamental cause of these foreboding trends is a policy focus on projects that are quick and easy, usually deploying off the shelf technologies, rather than investments in innovative technologies that might be competitive without the help of government subsidies;
3. Development of clean energy businesses face two primary obstacles, a technology gap, and a commercialization gap, or the failure to obtain the massive investments in commercial-scale testing that is required prior to full funding of such enterprises by the private sector. The latter problem is more imposing since it requires a “delicate balancing act” in which government must work with the private sector without undermining market competition.
4. The federal government in the United States often support the least risky projects, which are often the least innovative, including biofuels and windfarms. These projects are often unable to scale up without government investments and subsidies. Clean energy subsidies often are subject to a boom and bust cycle; as a consequence, private investors often focus on low-risk conventional technologies that can be deployed quickly before the next bust cycle in government investments;
5. State often also provide subsidies to clean energy producers and impose mandates to purchase clean energy, e.g. renewable energy portfolio standards. This patchwork of of standards also creates uncertainty and volatility that favors investments in conventional renewable energy sources;
6. A similar crisis in European clean energy markets is occurring, with the need for fiscal austerity leading to substantial cutbacks in subsidies. While government support has been much steadier in China, it lacks the infrastructure to utilize a substantial portion of the clean energy being produced;
7. If the U.S. government wishes to make substantial advances in clean energy deployment in the future, it needs to to change its orientation in three ways: 1. Adopting more policies that are more “pull” oriented, i.e. pull technologies into the market rather than push technologies, e.g. subsidies. Cap and trade is one example of this approach; a federal clean energy standard would be another potential approach, with the latter including other clean sources beyond those traditionally supported, including nuclear power and low-pollution coal plants. A federal standard should also shift away from mature renewable energy technologies toward more innovative technologies that compete on performance standards; 2. The U.S. government should focus subsidies in a smarter fashion. This includes closing the technology gap by backing more fundamental research in universities and government laboratories and early stage technologies that industry will not adequately fund. The federal government should also seek to close the commercialization gap by by lowering financial risks associated with new energy technologies, e.g. by improving and expanding loan guarantee programs; 3. The U.S. government should do more to engage with emerging markets, including more partnerships and encouragement of corporate joint projects.

Among the class discussion questions suggested by the piece:

1. Would increased government funding of potential “breakthrough” technologies pose the risk of the government picking “the wrong horse.” While the authors suggest that the government could obviate this risk by funding a variety of technologies and letting the private sector pick winners, would this prove easier said than done?,  That is, would the government influence private sector decisions by aiming more subsidies at the technologies it deemed most desirable, including from a political perspective?;
2. While more emphasis on “pull” oriented technologies might be desirable, what is likelihood that such approaches are viable in this political environment in the United States. How should such proposals be framed to engender the requisite bi-partisan support to implement such approaches?;
3. What are the incentives that drive government decision makers to back the least risky technologies? How do we change these incentives?