Given the growing evidence that temperatures are likely to increase 3-4C during this century, the exigency for aggressive and effective adapation responses continus to grow. For those of you teaching climate policy courses, especially at the graduate level, an excellent new piece has been published on how to assess the vulnerability of least-developed countries to climate-related extreme events, and the optimal timing of adaptation funding over the next five decades, Patt, et al., Estimating Least-Developed Countries’ Vulnerability to Climate-Related Extreme Events Over the Next 50 Years, 107 PNAS 1333-1337 (2010) (0pen access). The study employed an empirically derived model of human losses to climate-related extreme events, as an indicator of vulnerability, and sought to assess optimal allocation of adapatation funding on a 50-year timescale. The study developed a set of scanrios for losses in Mozambique and then extrapolated the results to 23 other developing countries.

Among the key findings of the study:

1. Vulnerability in the countries studied may rise faster in the next two decades than in the three decades thereafter, indicating that substantial frontloading of adaptation interventions would be judicious;
2. While the overall need for adaptation measures will continue to rise thereafter, LDCs will likely be capable of engaging in a larger share of autonomous adaptation by the second quarter of the century, reducing both their losses associated with climate change and need for external financial assistance;
3. The two conclusions above put into question a primary rationale for slowing ramping up assistance, ie. that adaptation needs will increase as climate change continues;
4. As we cross temperature thresholds of 2C, steadily rising climate impacts or the effects of cumulative changes on ecosystems may overwhelm the ability of either rich or poor countries to adapt.

The conclusions of this study, if validated in other research, could be extremely important, in that it emphasizes the urgency of accelerating adaptation commitments under the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. Among the questions that might be interesting to discuss in class are the following:

1. Does the study make a compelling argument that extreme weather events is a reliable proxy for projected climate change impacts, including cumulative impacts, e.g. sea level rise and increasingly negative impacts of temperature and precipitation declines on agricultural production? If not, how might that impact its conclusions?

2. Does the study do a good job of assessing potential ecosystem impacts, and is it conclusions about capabilities to respond valid in this context?

3. If its conclusions that temperature increases of 2C and above might overwhelm adaptation efforts, and this could occur by mid-century, is it conclusions that income in developing countries, and their ability to autonomously adapt, valid? If not, what would be the implications for adaptation interventions?

The Pacific Legal Foundation of Sacramento, a conservative public interest legal organization has recently filed a petition with the EPA, contending  that “the process that yielded the endangerment finding (under the Clean Air Act)  has been called into question by what is popularly known as “Climategate.” Thus, PLF has called for a reassessment by the agency’s Scientific Advisory Board. The petition, a summary of the case, and a PF attorney video is available on the PLF site.

This could be an interesting addition to a classroom discussion of EPA’s efforts to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act as it would afford instructors the opportunity to discuss the implications of “Climategate” for climate change science, and the role of pressure groups e.g. PLF in domestic U.S. climate politics.

I personally welcome this challenge by PLF. As I’ve indicated in previous blogs, I think that “Climategate” is a tempest in a teapot, and that both the University of East Anglia’s underlying findings are sound, and a focus on the foibles of scientists at this institution ignores an overwhelming number of independent assessments making similar findings. When the Bush administration asked the National Academies of Science to reevaluate the 4^th Assessment Report of the IPCC, it returned findings that vindicated AR4, and helped to illuminate the science of climate change and accentuate the need to act, engendering substantial publicity in the process. A similar effort to put climate change science in the dock here will presumably produce similar results, so bring it on!

An excellent piece supporting a research program on solar radiation management geoengineering was published this week by the journal Nature, David W. Keith, Edward Parson & M. Granger Morgan, Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now, 463 Nature 426-27 (2010) (accessible without subscription).

Among the takeaways from the article:

1. Solar radiation management (SRM) geoengineering (defined as adding light-scattering aerosols to the upper atmosphere or increasing the lifetime and reflectivity of low-altitude clouds to exert a cooling effect) could offset projected temperature increases this century at a cost 100x less than through emissions cuts, or merely a few billions annually;
2. Research on SRM has been extremely limited to date, largely restricted to a handful of climate-model studies using very simple parameterizations of aerosol microphysics; the potential hazards of SRM (which the article indicates includes potentially less precipitation and less evaporation, potentially creating regional “winners” and “losers” can only be assessed through in-situ testing, which will cost millions of dollars;
3. It would be “reckless” to conduct the first large-scale SRM tests under an emergency scenario; we shoudl expand experiments gradually to scales big enough to produce barely detectable climate effects, and to reveal unexpected problems, but small enough to limit risks;
4. Research should be conducted using a “blue team/red team” approach, in which one team proposes an approach and the other works to identify risks and why proposals might not prove effective;
5. A better alternative to hasty pursuit of international regulation would be seeking to engender international cooperation and norms from the bottom up, as occurred with the landmine convention; this should include an international program of research and risk assessment by multiple independent teams;
6. While some fear that geoengineering research and potential deployment could lead to a “moral hazard,” i.e. weaken a commitment to mitigation, there’s a great threat to mitigation effort by allowing for the possibility of SRM without scrutiny of actual requirements, limitations and risks; moreover, if SRM proves unworkable or poses unacceptable risks, the sooner we discover this, the less of a moral hazard geoengineering will pose.

This piece would provide an excellent foundation for discussing geoengineering options. Among the potential questions for students that could flow from it include the following:

• Is it realistic to believe that an SRM program could be shut down once substantial research programs ensued, i.e. isn’t their a danger of a “political lock in” that would make deployment inevitable at some point, exacerbating the potential threat of moral hazard?;
• What is the potential moral hazard threat the geoengineering might pose for adaptation efforts?;
• Even if a bottom-up research approach is optimal, would we ultimately need international governance should we proceed with full-scale deployment, and if yes, what would be the appropriate regime(s) to do so?;
• Should any proposals for full-scale deployment of geoengineering include a liability mechanism for potential damages to the interests of some States?