There are, of course, many reviews of COP15 that one can assign to students, including a number that have been reviewed recently on the blog. However, one of the best ones I’ve reviewed to date is: Benito Mueller, Copenhagen 2009: Failure or Final Wake-Up Call for Our Leaders?, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Feb. 2010. Mueller not only provides an excellent summary of the key developments from the meeting, including a really good analysis of the Copenhagen Accord and the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP texts, but he also explains the political machinations at the meeting that may have had a profound impact on the outcomes, a critical contextual analysis absent in many of the other pieces I’ve seen.

Among the key take-aways from the report:

1. The reference in the mitigation section of the Copenhagen Accord to equitable considerations leaves open the possibility that the global emissions reduction burden could be shared equitably, perhaps on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities;
2. It is unclear whether only small island states and less developed countries will be elgible for financial support for mitigation efforts, or whether other non-Annex I States will also be eligible. Mueller cites an analysis that concludes that other non-Annex I States may be eligible on a case-by-case basis as determined by the inchoate Copenhagen Green Climate Fund;
3. It is possible that the High Level panel established by the parties at Copenhagen to explore potential sources of revenue for the funding mechanisms in  Accord could hep facilitate funding, or could detract if it’s used as an alternative negotiating forum to the AWG-LCA financial negotiations;
4. A red flag in the financing context is whether the U.S. will seek to engineer a burden-sharing arrangement for the Green Climate Fund, meaning that all Parties would be expected to contribute;
5. It is unclear at this point if the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund is meant to manage the $10 billion in “fast start” money proposed in the Accord, and the interface of this fund with the AWG-LCA’s proposed Climate Fund/Facility; [Editor's note: many of us believe that the regime already has way too many different funding mechanisms, a source of frustration and confusion for many Parties seeking to avail themselves of such funds]
6. The “blame game” that ensued after Copenhagen, with Parties e.g. China and India excoriating each other in the press, is not helpful, particularly since much of it was carried out at the Ministerial level;
7. Some Parties to the UNFCCC believe that Copenhagen may have spelled the end to large-scale multilateral initiatives; as one Indian official commented, “small group pacts may become more important than multilateral treaties;”
8. It is noteworthy that the Chinese and Indian notifications post-Copenhagen did not reference the Copenhagen Accord;
9. While there may be merit in reexamining the consensus rule in the climate regime, many States beyond those who openly opposed adoption of the Copenhagen Accord were angered by the lack of transparency in many aspects of the negotiations, including the release early on of the Danish text and work of the Friends of the Chair group.

While most of the analyses of the Copenhagen Accord to date have focused on its mitigation provisions, its adapatation provisions could also be critical given projected temperature increases this century of 2-4C. Linda Siegle of the Foundation for International Environmental Law & Development (FIELD) has prepared an excellent briefing note (5 pages) on the subject, Adaptation Under the Copenhagen Accord, Feb. 2010

Among the key take-aways from the note are the following:

1. The Accord is retrograde in that it reestablishes a link between adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and potential impacts of response measures. Given the fact that the causes and timing of these two phenomena can be different, and the groups affected have different vulnerabilities and interests, developing countries had successfully de-coupled the concepts in the Bali Action Plan. While the provisions of Copenhagen are not binding, it may exert substantal influence on future negotiations on the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP;
2. The reference in paragraph 3 of the Copenhagen Accord to the adaptation challenge faced by “all countries” ignores the principle of common but differentiated responsibilies and respective capabilities underpinning the UNFCCC;
3. The financing provisions of the Copenhagen Accord are problematic in the context of adaptation action for several reasons, including the absence of a mechanism for determining the mix of public and private funding, an absence of provision for where the or how the money is to be delivered, and perhaps most critically (from my perspective), the absence of a dedicated source of funds. The brief also addresses the hard work ahead to develop the protocols for the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund;
4. The Accord makes no provision for the development of concrete infrastructure to guide implementation of adaptation actions, including the provision of pertinent technologies;
5. The emergence of the BASIC group (U.S., China, India, South Africa and Brazil) may pave the way for climate change decisionmaking to being moved to other forums, e.g. the G8, G20 or Major Economies Forum. This may bode badly for particularly vulnerable developing countries who have very little input in such forums. It is critical that the primary decisionmaking should remain under the aegis of the UNFCCC.